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JUDGES, JURIES, AND PATENT CASES­
AN EMPIRICAL PEEK INSIDE THE 
BLACK BOX 
Kimberly A. Moore* 
Honest to God, I don't see how you could try a patent matter to a jury. 
Goodness, I've gotten involved in a few of these things. It's like some­
body hit you between your eyes with a four-by-four. It's factually so 
complicated. 
- Judge Alfred V. Covello1 
INTRODUCTION 
The frequency with which juries participate in patent litigation has 
skyrocketed recently. At the same time, there is a popular perception 
that the increasing complexity of technology being patented ( espe­
cially in the electronic, computer software, biological and chemical 
fields) has made patent trials extremely difficult for lay juries to un­
derstand. These developments have sparked extensive scholarly de­
bate and increasing skepticism regarding the role of juries in patent 
cases.2 
* Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. B.S.E.E. 1990, M.S. 
1991, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1994, Georgetown. I am grateful to Anita 
Bernstein, Theodore Eisenberg, David Hyman, Bruce Kobayashi, Leandra Lederman, Mark 
Lemley, Clarisa Long and Matthew Moore for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
work. I wish to thank the Statistics Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
with special thanks to Maurice Galloway for providing a starting point for my research. I 
would also like to thank the many research assistants who helped with data collection and 
Marilyn S. Murphy and Susan G. Dorsey for statistical help. For additional information or 
comments, the author can be contacted at kamoore@gmu.edu. 
1. Judicial Panel Discussions on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1 127, 1144 
(1993) (statement of Judge Covello, U.S. District Judge, Dist. of Conn.). 
2. See, e.g., THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO 
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 107 (1992) [hereinafter ADVISORY REPORT] (discussing 
problems with jury trials of patent cases); Fourth Biennial Patent System Major Problems 
Conference, 34 IDEA 77 (1994) [hereinafter Major Problems Conference] (twenty-nine 
prominent patent practitioners and professors debate the role of the jury in patent cases); 
John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction 
Concurrent with that of the District Courts?, 32 Haus. L. REV. 67, 70-84 (1995) (reporting 
that principal complaints regarding adjudication of patent suits are unpredictability, delay, 
and expense); Edmund L. Andrews, A 'White Knight' Draws Cries of 'Patent Blackmail,' 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1990, § 3, at 5 (calling a jury trial of a patent case "a 'judicial lottery,' an 
often unpredictable system that can yield huge rewards for those who are sufficiently aggres­
sive"); Richard B. Schmitt, Juries' Role in Patent Cases Reconsidered, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 
1994, at B6 (quoting patent attorney Donald Dunner as saying, "Give Llurors] a complicated 
biotechnology case or one involving lasers or computers, and their eyes glaze over," and Pro­
fessor Martin J. Adelman as saying that jury confusion has created "a system of justice that is 
365 
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Juries have participated in some aspects of patent litigation since 
the enactment of the first patent statute in 1790, which provided for 
"such damages as shall be assessed by a jury."3 The enactment of the 
Patent Act of 1870, however, which gave equity courts the power to 
award common law damages,4 spawned an era in which patent cases 
were almost exclusively decided by the bench. This pattern has 
changed only recently - and the change has been dramatic. In 1940, 
2.5% of all patent cases tried in district court were heard by juries.5 
From 1968 to 1970, the figure was almost unchanged at 2.8%.6 By con­
trast, from 1997 to 1999, 59% of all patent trials were tried to juries.7 
This surge in jury requests has prompted a flurry of recent litigation 
over the right to a jury trial in patent litigation.8 
basically a lottery"). As Judge Nies stated in her dissent in In re Lockwood, "No more im­
portant nor contentious an issue arises in patent law jurisprudence than the appropriate role 
of juries in patent litigation." In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 515 U.S. 1 182 (1995). 
3. Act of April 10, 1790, ch.7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 .  
4 .  Act of July 8 ,  1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206. 
5. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
ANNUAL REPORT 109 tbl. 8 (1941). 1940 was the first year these statistics were compiled. 
6. In 1968, 3.7% of the cases that went to trial (4 of 108 cases) were tried to a jury. 
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANNUAL 
REPORT 209 tbl. C4 (1968). In 1969, 2.1 % of the cases that went to trial (2 of 95 cases) were 
tried to a jury. DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 222 tbl. C4 (1969). In 1970, 
2.6% of the cases that went to trial (3 of 116 cases) were tried to a jury. DIRECTOR ADMJN. 
OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 245b tbl. C4 (1970). 
7. In fiscal year 1997, 52% of all patent cases (54 out of 103) were tried to a jury. 
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., JUD. Bus. U.S. CTS. 153 tbl. C4 (1997). In fiscal year 1998, 60% (62 
out of 103) of all patent cases were tried to a jury. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs., JUD. Bus. U.S. 
CTS. 167 tbl. C4 (1998). In fiscal year 1999, 62% of all patent cases (61 out of 98) were tried 
to a jury. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., JUD. Bus. U.S. CTs. 161 tbl. C4 (1999). 
8. The Federal Circuit recently has had three occasions to consider whether the Seventh 
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial applies to certain aspects of patent litigation. The first 
was the 1995 case, In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir .), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995), in 
which the Federal Circuit held that there was a Seventh Amendment r ight to a jury trial of 
validity issues in a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court vacated this decision 
after the plaintiff withdrew his request for a jury trial. The second was the en bane decision 
in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996), which addressed the Seventh Amendment r ight to have a jury interpret patent 
claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit decision that the construction of 
patent claims is a task exclusively to be performed by the judge. The Court found that a 
judge, with her legal training, is better equipped than a jury to construe patent claims. 
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-89. The third, also in 1995, was another en bane decision, Hilton 
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co. , 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 
(1997), in which the Federal Circuit held that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
is a question of fact to be decided by the jury, rather than a question of law to be decided by 
a judge. The Supreme Court declined to decide conclusively whether this issue should be 
decided by a judge or jury, instead offering what it termed "guidance" to help facilitate uni­
formity and reliability. Hilton Davis, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. The Court encouraged greater par­
ticipation by the judge, more frequent use of summary judgment, and increased use of spe­
cial verdict forms and interrogatories. Id. 
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Despite extensive debate over the role of the jury in patent cases, 
no comprehensive empirical research has been done to ascertain, to 
the extent possible, the differences between jury and judge resolution 
of patent cases and the cause of the increased demand for jury trials in 
recent years. Given that patent litigation is an expensive endeavor -
it routinely costs each party in excess of a million dollars9 - there is an 
urgent need for empirical evidence on patent litigation. This Article 
undertakes that task by providing the first large-scale comparison of 
patent-holder win rates and recoveries in cases tried before juries and 
judges. The data include all patent cases that went to trial in the period 
from 1983 through 1999 (seventeen years of data).10 This time period 
was selected in order to analyze, among other things, the impact the 
creation of the Federal Circuit may have had on the resolution of pat­
ent trials in the district courts. 1 1  Accordingly, each of these cases was 
followed through to appeal to ascertain the issues appealed and the 
9. The American Intellectual Property Law Association conducted an economic survey 
in 1995 that examined the total cost of a patent infringement suit from filing to final adjudi­
cation, including all attorneys' fees, court costs, and other expenses. The analysis was broken 
down by geographic area and cost of litigation. In California, the median legal costs for a 
patent litigation were $2,493,000. 1999 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, 
REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 72 tbl. 22. 
10. Details on the acquisition of this data set are provided in Part II. The data set in­
cludes every patent case that went to trial in the United States from the period 1983-1999 as 
reported to the Administrative Office of the Courts. I have personally verified the substan­
tive issues resolved by the factfinder in each of these cases. 
11 .  The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by the merger of the United States Court of 
Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See Federal Courts Im­
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
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relative affirmance rate by issue, by adjudicator, and by year. The data 
were analyzed to determine whether popular perceptions or theoreti­
cal models about judges and juries can be validated, to provide de­
scriptive statistical data, and to develop predictive models from the 
data through regression analysis. 
At first blush, the results of the study suggest that complaints about 
jury bias and incompetency are unfounded. Judges and juries decide 
some issues differently. For example, juries are significantly more 
likely to find patents valid, infringed, and willfully infringed than 
judges. The differences, however, are not as profound or pervasive as 
one might expect. Judges and juries find patents enforceable with 
similar frequency. Additionally, juries seem as "accurate" in their de­
cisionmaking as judges are, as measured by appellate affirmance rate.12 
And yet, despite similar affirmance rates for judge and jury trials, 
there is some ground for concern with jury resolution of patent cases. 
To a greater degree than judges, juries tend to decide whole suits 
rather than delineate individual issues, even when separate issues are 
presented to them via special verdict forms or interrogatories. This 
finding suggests that judges are subtler at managing the complex na­
ture of patent cases and the technical distinctions between patents and 
products. It may also affirm the popular perception that juries are un­
duly swayed by tangential factors. 
In addition, who filed the suit is a significant predictor of win rate 
in jury trials. Juries are significantly pro-patentee in suits for infringe­
ment (68% patentee win rate); but when a possible infringer initiates a 
declaratory judgment action, the patentee only has a 38% win rate. If 
the same were true of judges, then one could attribute the difference 
in win rate to the strength of the cases - namely, that alleged infring­
ers only bring declaratory judgment suits when they have strong cases. 
But patentee win rates are substantially uniform in bench trials, re­
gardless of who initiated the suit. 
These data suggest that there may be some problems with juror 
adjudication of patent suits, though the system masks them. Deferen­
tial standards of review leave the Federal Circuit with little ability to 
disturb potentially flawed jury decisions. Moreover, the system lacks 
sufficient transparency to ascertain flaws in jury verdicts. The "black 
box" nature of jury verdicts leaves the Federal Circuit unable to cor­
rect inaccuracy or bias on the part of jurors. This reality - particularly 
in light of the increase in jury adjudication of patent disputes and the 
12. I do not mean to suggest that the mere lack of disturbance on the part of the Federal 
Circuit of tried issues on appeal indicates that the factfinder reached the "accurate" or r ight 
result. The most that can be said about the high affirmance rate is that the Federal Circuit 
could not conclude that the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence (on fact 
questions) or that the court's decision was not clearly erroneous (on fact questions). This 
issue is discussed more fully infra notes 125-132 and accompanying text. 
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potential for jury error where increasingly technical inventions are in­
volved - highlights the value of a peek inside the black box. 
Part I of the Article presents popular impressions of judge and jury 
outcomes in patent cases - in particular, popular perceptions of juror 
incompetence and bias - and considers how win-rate data might con­
firm or refute these beliefs. Part I also discusses selection effect theory, 
an economic model of the case selection process, and how win-rate 
data may be affected by parties' knowledge of adjudicator biases. Part 
II describes the data set, its acquisition, and the methodology used to 
analyze the data. Part III tests the impressions of judge and jury out­
comes in patent cases against the empirical data. It presents descrip­
tive statistics, the hypotheses, and the results of the regression models. 
Part III also discusses what insight the data lend on the role of the jury 
in the adjudication of patent disputes. 
I. IMPRESSIONS OF JU D GE AND JURY OUTCO MES 
A. Popular View: Juror Incompetence 
The increased participation by juries in patent cases and the de­
tailed attention given by the judiciary has caused a number of scholars 
and other commentators to question the propriety of jury resolution of 
patent cases. In this Part, I discuss the perceived wisdom regarding ju­
ries in patent cases. Typical complaints about the use of juries in pat­
ent cases include: juries are unable to comprehend the technology13 or 
the nuances of the legal standards for patent validity and infringement; 
juries are pro-patentee14 - they favor inventors and have a high re­
gard for the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office ("PT0");15 juries are bi­
ased in favor of domestic companies;16 juries award excessively high 
damage awards;17 and juries are swayed too easily by tangential fac-
13. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
14. See Allan N. Littman, The Jury's Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases: 
Markman, Hilton Davis and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207, 209 (1996) (stating that juries favor the 
patent holder); Major Problems Conference, supra note 2, at 82 (quoting patent attorney 
Don Dunner: "I am privy, as other [sic] of you may be, to some statistics in Delaware. The 
last fourteen patent jury cases tried in the District of Delaware, all resulted in holdings in 
favor of the patent owner except for one, which was a hung jury, and that does not bode well 
for the system. I don't think jurors by and large are capable [of] doing the job nearly as well 
as judges"). 
15. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
16. See Jack L. Lahr, Bias and Prejudice Against Foreign Corporations in Patent and 
Other Technology Jury Trials, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 405, 405 (1992) ("A widespread perception 
within the corporate communities of many industrial countries holds that they will be treated 
unfairly in U.S. jury trials due to the jury bias and prejudice against foreigners."). 
17. See Timothy L. Swabb, Federal Circuit Cannot Stop Runaway Jury Awards in Patent 
Suits; Companies Should Insure Themselves Against this Risk, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: 
PATENTS, Sept. 5, 1995, at 11 ,  11. 
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tors.18 Jury consultants believe that juries do have distinct biases and 
preconceptions in patent cases.19 These popular perceptions of juror 
incompetence and bias have caused commentators to argue that the 
role of the jury in patent litigation should be severely limited, and 
many alternatives have been proposed.20 
Although purely anecdotal, the following transpired between a 
judge and the jury in an antitrust case which involved, what was at the 








Do you know what demand substitutability is, [Juror A)? 
Well, I would like to kind of look into that. 
Okay. And how about the barriers to entry, [Juror B)? 
I would have to read about it . . . .  
All right. And how about reverse engineering, [Juror C)? 
That's when you would take a product and you would al­
ter it in a, or modify it for your own purpose; that is, you 
would reverse its function and use it in your own method. 
And [Juror D], what is software? 
18. See Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent­
Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 623 n.4, 624 (1996); Swabb, supra note 17, 
at 13. 
19. Decision Quest, a trial consulting firm specializing in jury behavior and trial strategy, 
has conc luded that juries believe that: 
- regarding the patent itself, patents are almost impossible to get,  the information in them is 
secret, they last forever, and they can't be invalidated; 
- regarding the patent process, patent applications are thoroughly reviewed by the Patent 
Office, and patent applicants don't lie; 
-regarding patent suits and the claims and defenses raised, patentees are expected to vigi­
lantly enforce their patents in a timely manner, plaintiffs often overdefend validity and wind 
up hurting their case, inequitable conduct is a difficult defense because the patent office im­
partially and diligently reviews each application, it is an important defensive tac tic to provide 
an alternative motivation for the plaintiffs suit, and the "human" aspect of the case story is 
more important than the details of the technology and infringement evidence; 
- regarding corporations , big companies stealing ideas from one another is commonplace, 
patents hurt competition between corporations, and it is not untisual for a company to 
change one or two things and then call it a new idea; and 
- regarding inventors , they are idealized by the jury, they are often victimized by powerful 
companies , and the more an inventor can be personalized in the case, the greater the impact 
on the jury. 
Nicholas M. Cannella & Timothy J. Kelly, Jury Trials and Mock Jury Trials, in PRACTICING 
LAW INSTITUTE, PATENT LITIGATION 1993, at 731, 741-42 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, and Literary Property, Handbook Series No. G-375). 
20. See, e.g., Richard P. Cusick  et al., A Critical Analysis of the Proposed National Patent 
Board, 13 J. OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 461 (1997) (endorsing a proposal for an industry­
sponsored National Patent Board ("NPB") to resolve patent infringement disputes); Lei­
bold, supra note 18 (recommending the creation of a specialized trial court or panels of ex­
pert juries to resolve patent cases); Major Problems Conference, supra note 2; Pegram, supra 
note 2 (discussing inadequacies in patent infringement adjudication system and proposing 
that the U.S. Court of International Trade be given patent case jurisdic tion); Franklin Strier, 
The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 49 (1997) (pro­
posing use of specially qualified juries in cases such as patent litigation where the lay jury is 
ill-equipped to deal with the complexity of the issues being tried); Tom Arnold, Why is ADR 
the Answer?, COMPUTER LAW, July 1998, at 13 (suggesting that Alternative Dispute Resolu­
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It's software. 
Well, what is software? 
That's the paper software. 
What's the hardware? 
That's the wires and hardware. 
And what is - do you know what an interface is?21 
Yes. 
The Court: Can you given me an example of that? 
371 
Juror D: Well, if you take a blivet, turn it off one thing and drop it 
down, its an interface change, right?22 
This apparent lack of comprehension of the underlying technology ex­
emplifies the fears many harbor about jury resolution of patent cases. 
As technology becomes increasingly complex, especially in the soft­
ware and biotech fields, concerns would naturally escalate over a lay 
jury's ability to comprehend the technology in order to resolve the 
suits. These complaints often revolve around the educational make up 
of the jury.23 For example, after a jury ruled that AT&T had infringed 
a small company's patent, lawyers for AT&T complained that the jury 
consisted of "unemployed laborers and housewives [who] did not un­
derstand that stuff."24 Despite increasing complexity of technology and 
21. An interface is the connection between a computer and an auxiliary piece of equip­
ment. This concept was discussed at length during this trial. 
22. Record at 19,490-91, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 
(N.D. Cal. 1978), aff d sub nom. on other grounds, Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 
1 188 (9th Cir. 1980). 
23. For example, following the antitrust trial quoted above, see supra text accompanying 
note 22, the district court judge noted that only 1 out of 11 jurors had even limited technical 
education. See /LS Peripherals, 458 F. Supp. at 448. Here is another example of attention to 
jurors' educational backgrounds: 
After three years of trial preparation, almost a month of courtroom battle and six hours of 
jury deliberation, the patent trial between inventor Raymond Damadian and General 
Electric Co. appeared to have come to a climax. "We have reached a decision," the bailiff 
said, reading the message from the jury to a hushed audience of lawyers who had rushed in 
to brace for the verdict. "We need more Diet Coke." GE's attorneys didn't smile at the at­
tempted humor. Nor were they amused two hours later when the jury delivered a real 
punchline: A $110.5 million verdict against GE for infringing on two patents covering mag­
netic resonance imaging technology. GE's not alone in being touchy on this issue. The 
Fairfield, Conn.-based manufacturer is only the latest company to get walloped by a big jury 
verdict in a patent suit. And like most corporate defendants, GE took its wrath out on the ju­
rors, saying the panel "apparently acted on emotion, not facts or law" by favoring an under­
dog inventor over a deep-pocketed corporation. Corporate defendants and patent lawyers 
have long griped that intellectual property litigation is too complex to leave to plumbers, 
housewives, mailmen and music teachers. 
Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1995, at 6, available at 1995 
WL 6216112 (emphasis added). 
24. Schmitt, supra note 2; see also ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 2, at 107 (asserting 
that comprehending patent trial principles is very demanding on the factfinder); Steven I. 
Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 190, 193-98 (1990) (arguing that dissatisfaction with the jury system exists because of 
two conflicting expectations - that the jury should be (1) an accurate decision maker, and 
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the corresponding patents that protect it, there is no minimum educa­
tional requirement for serving on a jury in a patent case - "blue rib­
bon" or expert juries are not mandated, regardless of technical com­
plexity. 
If juries are unable to understand the technology or apply the law, 
then their decisions will be based on emotional or other irrelevant fac­
tors. 25 Who tells the better story? Who is the more likeable or sympa­
thetic party? Many commentators suspect that the party who demands 
a jury in a patent case has a weaker case26 and therefore prefers an 
adjudicator less likely to focus on the merits. 
Many attorneys believe that juries are mesmerized by the inven­
tor's story and tend to favor the patentee.27 Juries respond well to de­
scriptions of the inventive process and the inventor's flash of genius or 
slow methodical trial and error. Whether it is Bob Kearns taking on 
the automotive industry over his intermittent windshield wipers28 or 
Jerome Lemelson suing Mattel over "Hot Wheels,"29 juries appear to 
love inventors. If this is true, we would expect to see higher win rates 
for patentees than for alleged infringers in jury trials.30 
There is a popular perception that jurors are more likely than 
judges to defer to the administrative patentability determinations 
made by the PT0.31 Juries may be impressed with the blue ribbon on 
(2) impartial - although impartiality virtually requires that jurors do not possess the training 
or experience necessary to deal with issues requiring specialized knowledge). 
25. See Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, supra note 23 (quoting GE attorneys 
as stating that the jury "apparently acted on emotion, not facts or law"); infra note 36 
(quoting a Chief Patent Counsel as saying, "Jurors' decisions are based on emotional percep­
tions of good guy vs. bad guy."). 
26. 1 ETHAN HORWITZ & LESTER HORWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & 
TACTICS§ 2.02[6), at 2-21 to 2-22 (1995) ("[C)ourts suspect some weakness on the merits of 
the case of the party who puts a patent case on the jury docket."); Schmitt, supra note 2 
(quoting Martin Adelman: "There are many lawyers who believe they can benefit by jury 
confusion."). 
27. See, e.g., Jonathon Taylor Reavill, Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape 
of Equity in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 366 (1996) (stating 
that "juries also tend to idealize inventors"); Barry S. Wilson, Patent Invalidity and the Sev­
enth Amendment: Is the Jury Out?, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1787, 1787 n.4 (1997) (asserting 
that juries prefer individual inventors challenging large corporations or foreign defendants); 
Andrews, supra note 2 (observing that juries "have proven eager to side with inventors 
against large companies"). 
28. A jury awarded Robert Kearns $19 million for Chrysler's infringement of his inter­
mittent windshield wiper patent. High Court Refuses to Hear Verdict Appeal by Chrysler, 
WALL ST. J., March 21, 1995, at B7. After a second jury found Ford liable for infringement, 
Ford settled with Kearns for $10.2 million. Id. 
29. An Illinois jury awarded Jerome Lemelson $25 million in his 1989 action against 
Mattel over "Hot Wheels." Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (reversing jury finding of infringement). 
30. Unless the parties accurately factor this bias into predictions and settlements. See 
infra Section J.B. 
31. See 1 HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 26, at§ 2.02[6), at 2-21. 
November 2000] Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases 373 
the cover of a patent and the fact that the patent was reviewed by an 
"expert agency" with technically trained examiners. Moreover, juries 
are instructed that an issued patent carries a presumption of validity 
that can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Judges, 
on the other hand, may harbor more skepticism about agency accuracy 
and may be willing to scrutinize agency decisions closely. If this is true, 
we would expect patent-holder win rates on validity to be higher in 
jury trials than bench trials. 
In 1999, I conducted a survey of forty-seven Chief Patent Counsels 
of leading corporations32 and found that this group had little confi­
dence in juries' ability to understand the technology in patent cases 
and, interestingly, not much more confidence in the ability of judges.33 
In addition, the respondents believed that juries award higher dam­
ages than judges do,34 that juries are more likely to uphold the validity 
of a patent,35 and that juries are biased in favor of the patent holder.36 
If the jury is not an ideal adjudicator, the question is who should 
step in and resolve patent cases? There are some who believe that ju­
ries should continue to resolve patent cases because they are compe­
tent to do so or because there is no evidence to suggest that judges 
32. This survey was conducted at the 1999 annual conference of the Association of Chief 
Patent Counsels. In order to be a member of this organization and attend the conference, 
you must head the intellectual property legal group (Chief Patent Counsel) of a corporation 
which has at least five full-time intellectual property attorneys on staff. The average level of 
experience of this survey group was 25.3 years of practice. In fact, all but three of the re­
spondents had at least 15 years of experience practicing patent law. 
33. I asked the respondents to quantify on a scale of 1-10 (with 10 being very confident) 
their level of confidence in the jury's ability. When asked, "Are juries able to understand 
technology in patent cases?," the respondents' answers averaged 3.7. There were many 
comments written on the survey such as this one from a Chief Patent Counsel with more 
than 30 years experience, "JURIES JUST PLAIN CAN'T DECIDE PATENT CASES 
PERIOD . . . .  THIS IS HOPELESS." Many of the Chief Patent Counsels surveyed believed 
that juror decisionmaking was often swayed by tangential or emotional issues such as attor­
ney personalities, likeable witnesses, etc. One Chief Patent Counsel with 35 years experience 
commented, "I have won and lost cases with juries, and in both situations, the jury reasoning 
was not related to the facts." 
In response to the question, "Are judges able to understand the technology in patent 
cases?," the confidence level was only 5.6. 
34. In response to the question, "Do you think that juries generally award higher dam­
ages than judges? YES or NO, " 86% of the respondents answered YES (38). 
35. In response to the question, "Do you believe juries are more likely to hold a patent 
valid?," 85% (40) believed the jury was more likely to uphold the validity of a patent, 15% 
(7) believed that there was an equal chance of validity or invalidity and 0% believed juries 
were more likely to hold a patent invalid. 
36. When asked, "Do you think jurors are biased in any of the following ways: Jurors 
favor the patent holder (inventor)? YES NO," 86% of the respondents (37) answered YES. 
One Chief Patent Counsel with 25 years experience characterized her confidence in juries as 
follows: "Most jurors' attention span is too short to assimilate and analyze the conflicting 
information presented by opposing counsels. Jurors' decisions are based on emotional per­
ceptions of good guy vs. bad guy." 
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would be better at resolving these cases.37 In fact, Chief Judge Mayer 
of the Federal Circuit, commented: "[T]here is simply no reason to 
believe that judges are any more qualified than juries to resolve the 
complex technical issues often present in patent cases. "38 There are 
more than 600 active district court judges and more than 200 senior 
district court judges. With only 2000 patent cases being filed each year 
and only approximately 100 of these reaching trial,39 a district court 
judge's exposure to patent cases is very limited. Most judges have no 
special knowledge, education or training in the technology that is at 
issue in a patent case. It has even been suggested that a jury may be 
better equipped to resolve a patent case: whereas judges generally 
must divide their attention among several cases, a jury can focus exclu­
sively on the one patent case presented to it.4° Finally, some have ar­
gued that patent law is not unique in terms of its complexity; other 
fields of law have equal or greater technological and legal complex­
ity.41 
Popular perception suggests that jurors are not capable of resolv­
ing patent cases; that their decisionmaking will be based on emotional 
or tangential factors or bias. If juries are biased in favor of the patent 
holder and are not competent to comprehend patent cases as many 
suggest, the data ought to reflect a high win rate for the patent holder 
when the jury adjudicates patent cases. 
B. A Theoretical Model: Selection Effect Theory 
(The 50% Implication) 
For the rate of plaintiff verdicts to be an accurate measure of the influ­
ence of a legal standard, of judicial or jury attitudes, or of the substantive 
fairness of any adjudicatory process, litigated disputes must be represen­
tative of the entire class of underlying disputes. 42 
For example, a measure of patentee outcome rates in tried cases 
would only confirm popular perceptions that juries are pro-patentee, if 
the tried cases are a random subset of all disputes. Most scholars 
37. See, e.g., Howard T. Markey, On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369, 372 
(1987); supra text accompanying note 33. 
38. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, 
C.J., concurring). 
39. See infra Table 1 and accompanying text. 
40. See Greg J. Michelson, Note, Did the Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and 
the Spirit of the Constitution in its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1707, 
1734 (1997) (arguing that judges are not better than juries at deciding patent cases because 
they have relatively little experience with patent cases, no technical expertise, and may be 
distracted by other trials). 
41. See Markey, supra note 37, at 372. 
42. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (emphasis added). 
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agree, however, that the small percentage of all legal disputes that 
reach trial is not a representative or random sampling of all cases.43 To 
predict the selection of cases for trial, several formal economic models 
have been developed.44 
George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein present a selection effect 
model of the litigation process that predicts that the tendency for 
plaintiffs to prevail at trial will approach a probability of 50% as the 
fraction of cases going to trial approaches zero.45 This theory is predi­
cated on parties making rational determinations regarding whether to 
settle or litigate, based on economic factors such as: the potential gain 
from a favorable outcome and the potential loss from an adverse one, 
the estimated likelihood of success at trial (including both the likeli­
hood of success under the applicable legal standard and the likelihood 
that the decisionmaker will reach an accurate result),46 and the transac­
tion costs (litigation costs).47 
According to this model, the disputes that proceed to trial are the 
cases in which the parties substantially disagree on their chance of suc­
cess, which is most likely to happen when the case falls close to the 
governing decision standard (that is, where the estimated outcome ap­
proaches 50% ) .48 When the legal rule or the adjudicator clearly favors 
one side, economically rational behavior dictates that the parties 
should settle to avoid transaction costs.49 The cases that proceed to 
trial are likely the difficult or close cases in which the parties are more 
likely to disagree on the predicted outcome. These close cases should 
43. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights 
and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1568 (1989) (describing "expectations theory," which 
suggests that tried cases might not reflect the pool of all disputes); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, 
THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LA w AND ITS STUDY 58 (2d ed. 1951) (commenting that liti­
gated cases bear the same relationship to the underlying pool of disputes "as does homicidal 
mania or sleeping sickness, to our normal life"). 
44. See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predic­
tors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 322-24 (1999) (discussing three formal 
models for predicting the selection of cases for trial: divergent expectations, asymmetrical 
stakes, and asymmetrical information). Each of the economic models for predicting case se­
lection is predicated on one or more assumptions that may not be present in actual cases. 
These assumptions include: (1) risk neutrality of the parties; (2) equal stakes; (3) equal in­
formation; ( 4) identical outcome estimation; and (5) lack of strategic behavior. Id. 
45. Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 19-20. 
46. The selection effect model allows for "divergent expectations" of the parties in esti­
mating outcome. For example, a patent holder may believe that she has a 60% chance of 
winning the case on the merits, whereas the alleged infringer, with the same information, 
evaluates the patent holder's chance of success at 40%. Under such circumstances, both par­
ties may be unwilling to settle the case. The selection effect model allows for these self­
serving estimation errors but assumes that the errors are random and based on differences of 
opinion rather than asymmetrical information. 
47. Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 4. 
48. Id. at 16. 
49. Alternatively, one would expect these cases to be resolved by the judge on disposi­
tive motion. In either event, they are unlikely to proceed to trial. 
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fall more or less evenly on both sides of the decisional standard re­
sulting in a 50% win rate.50 
There are two ways to utilize this economic model to make predic­
tions regarding patent-holder win rates.51 First, selection effect theory 
suggests that the empirical data regarding patent-holder win rates at 
trial ought to approach 50% regardless of who the legal standards fa­
vor or what biases exist in the adjudication system. Considering 
whether this simple economic model will accurately predict patent­
holder win rates in tried cases requires thinking about how patent 
cases may deviate from the purified assumptions of the model. Second, 
selection effect theory suggests that there ought not to be any signifi­
cant differences in resolution of these cases by judges and juries since 
any biases that exist for the adjudicator would be factored into the 
outcome predictions in the determination of what cases to take to trial. 
1. Assumptions Underlying the 50% Model 
Many empirical studies have failed to substantiate the 50% predic­
tion.52 The win rate tends to be closest to 50% among those cases that 
conform most closely to the underlying assumptions of the Priest/Klein 
model.53 First, the model is an "all or nothing" model where damages 
are stipulated and only liability is in issue.54 Moreover, the model as-
50. Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 3. 
51. Several scholars have found it useful to test this model using a database that com­
pares the characteristics of cases that went to trial and settled cases. See, e.g., Lederman, su­
pra note 44 (using a database of settled and tried Tax Court cases to confirm that cases are 
not randomly selected for trial and identifying five independent variables - whether the 
case went through an IRS appeals process, the dollar amount at stake, and three characteris­
tics about the judge - that were statistically significant in predicting an increased likelihood 
that a case would go to trial); Jeffrey M. Perloff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Settlements in Private 
Antitrust Litigation, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 149 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) 
(confirming a nonrandom selection of antitrust cases for trial and identifying predictors of 
settlement based on surveys sent to parties that settled). The characteristics of settled versus 
tried patent cases are not compared to validate selection effect theory (which would be a 
very useful endeavor), but rather evaluate patent-holder win rates to determine if they sub­
stantiate any of the economic models. 
52. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial By Jury or Judge: Tran­
scending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1175-76 (1992) (only 23 of 93 types of 
bench trials and 16 of 93 types of jury trial show plaintiff win rates from 45% to 55%); 
Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Ap­
proach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 236-42 (1996) (dis­
cussing 20 empirical studies which have found plaintiff win rates not approximating 50%, 
summarizing the numerous empirical studies that have tested the 50% rule, and concluding 
that the win rate is closer to 50% among cases that conform more closely to the underlying 
assumptions of the Priest/Klein model). Some commentators have argued, however, that 
these deviations from the 50/50 prediction can be explained by deviations from the underly­
ing assumptions. E.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the 
TriaVSettlement Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 17, 
27 (David A. Anderson ed., 1996). 
53. See Kessler et al., supra note 52, at 257. 
54. See Kobayashi, supra note 52, at 17. 
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sumes equal stakes,55 symmetrical information,56 risk neutrality,57 and 
lack of strategic behavior.58 To the extent that one or more of these as­
sumptions does not hold true for a given set of disputes, the outcomes 
may not approximate 50%. 
At least one of these assumptions does not hold true in patent 
cases.59 If the parties have differential stakes in the outcome, litigation 
is more likely when the party with greater stakes has a higher prob­
ability of success. When the plaintiff stands to gain by winning the ex­
act amount the defendant will lose, the win rate should approximate 
the decisional standard (50% ), if the parties have accurate information 
about success rates. When the stakes are greater to one party, more 
victories for that party ought to be observed in litigated disputes.60 
In patent cases, the stakes are frequently asymmetrical. A patent is 
by its nature a public right. It is not a private contract between two 
parties, but rather a property right that impacts all competition in a 
given technology. In most competitive markets, the patent holder has 
a much greater stake in the outcome of the litigation than does the al­
leged infringer. A limiting claim construction for the patent holder 
could insulate many non-parties from future infringement or, if the in­
fringer succeeds on its defenses of invalidity or unenforceability, the 
55. See id. at 29 (stating that "[o]ne of the most common explanations of deviations from 
the fifty-percent rules is the existence of asymmetric stakes"); Kessler, supra note 52, at 257 
(finding that "differential stakes . . .  affect[] win rates in the manner that the theory would 
suggest"). 
56. See Evan Osborne, Who Should Be Worried About Asymmetric Information in Liti­
gation?, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 399 (1999) (finding that asymmetric information does 
exist in cases that proceed to a decision and it that generally favors the defendant, by testing 
how litigants fare after trial relative to their expectations). 
57. A party is risk-neutral if they are indifferent between a guaranteed settlement 
amount of $6000 and proceeding to trial with a 60% chance of winning $10,000. A risk­
averse party would settle for less than $6,000 to avoid the risk. See W. Kip Viscusi, Product 
Liability Litigation With Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103 (1988) (determining, in 
products liability cases, "how the decisions to drop and to settle a claim are affected by risk 
aversion, as well as how risk aversion affects the settlement amounts"). 
58. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Nego­
tiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH . L. REV. 319, 328 (1991) (stating that 
strategic behavior by a party is an attempt to capture more of the surplus from the settle­
ment range); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Per­
mit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 259-60 (1999) 
(stating that finding a settlement range depends on the absence of strategic behavior). 
59. There are many identifiable real-world complications that could alter the expected 
outcome for this economic model, such as strategic behavior by the parties, the risk aversion 
or neutrality of the parties, asymmetrical information, a focus in the dispute on damages 
rather than liability, or differing abilities of counsel. None of these complications, however, 
exists for patent cases (any more than for any other type of case) in a systematic and predict­
able way which would cause the need to alter the prediction of the economic model. 
60. See Kobayashi, supra note 52, at 37 (noting a bias in the selection of cases towards 
the repeat litigant - that is, the party with the higher stakes). 
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patent will no longer be enforceable against anyone.61 This loss is sig­
nificantly greater than the monetary damages the infringer would have 
paid.62 
If these asymmetrical stakes are systematic and predictable, then 
we would expect to see a higher patent-holder win rate from the em­
pirical data. Because the patent holder stands to lose more than the 
defendant, the patent holder will be more risk-averse to trial. Hence, 
the patent holder will settle close cases (to avoid bad precedent or an 
invalid patent) and try only those cases it estimates it will win. In light 
of the systematic asymmetrical stakes present in most patent disputes, 
the empirical results should implicate a higher win rate for the patent 
holder (greater than 50% win rate for the patent holder). 
2. Selection Effect Theory Predicts Similar Win Rates for 
Judge and Jury Cases 
Under the selection effect theory, judge and jury patent-holder win 
rates should not reflect bias, even if juries may be biased in all of the 
popularly perceived manners, because the parties would factor these 
biases into the outcome estimations, and settle accordingly.63 Hence, 
the selection effect theory forecasts similar win rates for patent hold­
ers before judges and juries. The parties' selection of cases to take to 
trial would therefore incorporate the litigants' stereotypical views 
about judge and jury biases. Regardless of whether the overall patent­
holder win rate is 50% or higher than 50%, the win rate should not dif­
fer substantially in judge and jury cases. Even though there are sys­
tematic differential stakes in patent cases, these differential stakes ap­
ply equally to cases adjudicated by judge or jury. Deviations from the 
underlying assumptions are generally useful in explaining empirical re­
sults inconsistent with the economic model. These deviations, how­
ever, do not generally explain differences between judge and jury 
61. In a two-supplier market, the stakes might be closer to symmetrical. In such a mar­
ket, the patent holder would stand to win in damages exactly what the infringer would stand 
to lose. Whether the infringer wins the suit by succeeding on a defense of non-infringement 
or a defense that the patent is invalid or unenforceable is irrelevant. Regardless of how the 
suit is lost, the patent owner only loses the exact amount of money it would have won from 
the defendant (because there are no other potential infringers to sue). 
62. But the accused infringer may also have more at stake than the monetary damage 
award because of the injunctive relief that is almost guaranteed if the patent holder succeeds 
in the suit. In some circumstances, the injunction could dramatically upset the commercial 
status quo by forcing the infringer out of the market entirely. 
63. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 1 130 ("[A]ccording to this selection effect 
theory, any judge/jury distinction that the parties evaluate without systematic inaccuracy 
should not lead to a difference in win rates before judges and juries."); Priest & Klein, supra 
note 42, at 4 ("(P]otential litigants form rational estimates of the likely decision, whether it is 
based on applicable legal precedent or judicial or jury bias."). 
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patent-holder win rates, because they do not vary with the mode of 
trial.64 
II. THE STUDY 
Despite increasing skepticism regarding juror comprehension and 
bias in patent cases, no comprehensive research has been done to as­
certain the differences between judge and jury resolution of patent 
cases or the cause of the increased demand for jury trials in patent 
cases.65 Very little empirical or economic research has been performed 
on the function and impact of the patent system.66 This Article pro-
64. Professors Clermont and Eisenberg concluded that factors developed within the con­
text of selection effect theory and routinely used to explain deviations from the 50% rule 
(such as differential stakes) carry little weight because they do not vary with the mode of 
trial. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 1 130-31.  Minor differences between judge and 
jury win rates could arise if a difference existed in the ability of the parties (or their attor­
neys) to assess their chances of success with different adjudicators. See Donald Wittman, 
Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Genera­
tion of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 325-28 (1988) (discussing effect of 
differential assessments generally on win rate). 
65. Although no detailed empirical analysis has been undertaken to ascertain whether 
judges and juries behave differently in patent cases, it has been done for other fields. See, 
e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Clermont & 
Eisenberg, supra note 52. Kalven and Zeise) surveyed trial judges about jury verdicts in cases 
over which they presided in an attempt to ascertain how often the judge and the jury would 
have reached the same result. The study concluded that judges and juries agreed on outcome 
in a large number of personal injury cases, but that jury verdicts averaged 20% higher than 
the judges' awards would have been. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra, at 64 & n.13. Moreover, the 
study concluded that juries were not more pro-plaintiff than were judges and that there was 
no statistically significant difference in disagreement between judge and jury in difficult ver­
sus easy cases, indicating that complexity did not affect outcome. Id. at 157. Clermont and 
Eisenberg compared win rates before judges and juries in product liability and medical mal­
practice cases to conclude that neither the popular perception that juries are pro-plaintiff nor 
the academic theory that win rates should equalize was supportable. Clermont & Eisenberg, 
supra note 52, at 1 173. 
66. A 1987 study examined whether patents encouraged innovation across various in­
dustries and concluded that, in some industries, patents were not an effective means of en­
couraging innovation. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Re­
search and Development, in 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987); see 
also Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1995) (find­
ing that the higher the patent enforcement costs (litigation costs), the less likely biotech 
companies are to patent new inventions). More empirical research needs to be done to vali­
date the existence of the patent system as a mechanism for encouraging innovation. The uni­
verse of empirical studies pertaining to patent litigation is very small. There are two out­
standing studies that were conducted prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit. P.J. 
Federico studied validity and infringement data for litigated cases from 1948-1954 and found 
that appellate courts invalidated patents 63 % of the time and district courts invalidated pat­
ents 54% of the time. P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 233, 
236 tbl. 2, 237 tbl. 4 (1956). Gloria Koenig studied cases reported in the United States Patent 
Quarterly ("U.S.P.Q.") from 1953 through 1977 and found that findings of validity or inva­
lidity were reversed in 35% of the cases in which validity was an issue. See GLORIA K. 
KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS § 4.02, at 4-41 
n.35.2 (rev. ed. 1980). Koenig also noted the wide variation among the Circuits in the treat­
ment of validity. See id. at 4-33 to 4-36. This variation among the regional circuits in their 
treatment of validity and the forum shopping that resulted were the impetus for the creation 
of the Federal Circuit in 1982. There have also been studies examining the Federal Circuit's 
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vides the first large-scale comparison of patent-holder win rates before 
judges and juries. 
A. The Data Collection: The Administrative Office of the Courts 
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts compiles 
statistics on filed and terminated cases by subject matter. When a pat­
ent case is terminated, the district court files with the Administrative 
Office67 a form that includes the dates of filing and termination of the 
suit, the judicial district, the procedural stage of the termination (e.g. , 
by court action prior to trial, by the parties in a settlement, or after a 
trial) ,  the method of disposition (e.g. , default judgment, consent judg­
ment, jury verdict, bench trial), whether the case was tried to a judge 
or jury, who prevailed in the suit (plaintiff or defendant), and what re­
lief was granted. The data set consists of the population of tried cases 
from 1983 to 1999. The data reflect 1411 cases that reached trial, 1209 
of which were resolved by the factfinder. This latter figure includes 
533 jury trials and 676 bench trials.68 In these trials, 1948 individual 
patent claims were tried, 1676 of which were ruled on by the factfinder 
(781 by jury trial and 895 by bench trial) .  This includes every jury trial 
that has taken place in the last 17 years.69 
treatment of patents, most notably a study testing whether the Federal Circuit was more pro­
patentee than its predecessor courts. Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Fed­
eral Circuit's Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151 (1995). Finally, a recent study 
by Professors John Allison and Mark Lemley collected a database of written validity deci­
sions reported in the U.S.P.Q. from 1989-1996 (239 cases). John R. Allison & Mark A. 
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998). 
The authors determined that patents were found valid in 54% of the cases in their data set. 
Id. at 205. Among other things, the authors provide useful validity statistics by issue, i.e., by 
35 U.S.C. sections 101, 102, 103, and 112. Id. passim. In addition, they considered outcome 
variation based on variables such as the time the patent was in prosecution, the number of 
prior art references considered in prosecution, subject matter of the invention, and domestic 
vs. foreign patentee. Id. There is very little overlap between my study and the Alli­
son/Lemley study. I do not replicate their detailed analysis of the variables that underlie va­
lidity decisions. Also, the Allison/Lemley study did not consider other substantive issues that 
arise in patent cases, such as enforceability, infringement, willfulness, or damages. Moreover, 
their study considered only written decisions published in the U.S.P.Q., and juries do not 
write opinions. Therefore, their pool of jury decisions was limited (73 total) to cases in which 
the jury verdict was challenged and the district court generated an opinion regarding judg­
ment as a matter of law ("JMOL") or the case was appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 
211. 
67. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO 
JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, Transmittal 64, vol. XI, at 11-19-11-28 (March 1 ,  
1985). 
68. Cases that reached trial, but were not resolved by the factfinder were resolved on 
directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law prior to a final verdict by the factfinder, or 
they were settled by the parties during trial. 
69. This data set does not include cases resolved by district courts on dispositive motion 
which certainly shed light on how judges resolve patent cases. However, jury trial win rates 
in which the jury is resolving a disputed issue of fact and judge rulings on dispositive motion 
where the judge is deciding that no reasonable juror could conclude differently are not com­
parable. A more accurate comparison between judge and jury resolution of cases can be ac-
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B. Deficiencies in the Data 
The data acquired from the Administrative Office ("AO") have 
several weaknesses. Their major deficiency is that they do not contain 
detailed information about the cases. For example, the AO data are 
reported only in terms of plaintiffs and defendants. This creates a 
problem in determining a patentee win rate. If a suit is a declaratory 
judgment action brought by the infringer, rather than a patent in­
fringement suit, the data that report judgment for the plaintiff is actu­
ally judgment for the infringer rather than the patentee. While 14% of 
all patent trials were declaratory judgment actions, detailed verifica­
tion prevented this method of reporting from skewing the outcome 
rates. 
Another limitation in the data is that they only indicate which 
party won the suit, not the basis upon which the case was decided.70 In 
addition, the Administrative Office provides very little data on the 
amount of the damage awards. Only damage awards up to $9,999,000 
are recorded. Hence a $200 million damage award is reported the 
same way as a $10 million damage award.71 
Finally, a few reported cases were eliminated from the data set. 
Some were not patent trials. For example, a case would be classified as 
a patent trial, yet the patent claims might have been dismissed by dis­
positive motion and the only issue actually tried dealt with antitrust or 
copyright or trade secret. Since these suits were not patent trials, they 
were eliminated from the study. Duplicate cases were also elimi­
nated.72 
quired by limiting the analysis to cases where each adjudicator resolved a material issue of 
fact after a trial. These "close" cases provide the best insight into whether judges and juries 
decide cases differently (comparing apples to apples). Comparing win-rate data at various 
stages of litigation (such as when cases are resolved by the court on dispositive motion) and 
at what stage in the litigation courts generally resolve patent cases is the subject of further 
research I am currently performing. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: 
Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). 
70. A judgment for the defendant, for example, could indicate a finding of non­
infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability. 
71. Occasionally, I discovered inconsistencies in the way the damage award was re­
ported to the Administrative Office. While some jurisdictions reported the actual damages 
awarded by the factfinder, others apparently reported the final amount paid to the victor. 
This amount would include prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, attorneys' fees, and 
treble damages for willfulness. The damage awards used in this study were limited to the 
award granted by the fact-finder. For more detailed explanation, see infra (section on dam- · 
ages]. 
72. Consolidated cases which went to a single trial were often reported twice because of 
the existence of two separate docket numbers. I have eliminated these duplications from the 
data set. When a case actually resulted in more than one trial because issues were bifurcated 
or because a second trial was required after the appeal was remanded, the case is actually 
reported twice. 
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C. The Collection Process 
I sought to verify the Administrative Office data and to fill in the 
missing data by researching each of the decisions reported to the Ad­
ministrative Office. These data were obtained by locating opinions 
related to the case or news reports, special verdict forms, district court 
orders and judgments, complaints, and docket sheets from the district 
courts. When reported district court or appellate decisions detailing 
the trial court proceedings could not be located, I contacted the courts, 
the parties, or the attorneys who represented the parties and obtained 
judgment sheets, courts orders, and verdict forms. In the small number 
of instances in which verification of whether a particular issue was 
tried was not possible, it was excluded from the data set.73 For each 
case, the following information was collected: 
• Party names and docket number. 
• Date the suit was filed and date of termination. 
• Judicial district in which the proceedings occurred. 
• Stage of proceedings when the termination occurred and the 
manner of the termination (summary judgment, settlement, mo­
tion to dismiss, trial, etc.) .  
• Whether the adjudicator was judge or jury. 
• Which party prevailed in the suit (patentee or alleged infringer74). 
• Which party was the patentee. 
• How many separate claims were tried (multiple patents or multi­
ple accused products). 
• Whether the factfinder found the patent valid or invalid.75 
• Whether the factfinder found the patent enforceable or unen­
forceable. 
• Whether the factfinder found the patent infringed or not in­
fringed. 
• Whether the factfinder found the patent willfully infringed or not 
willfully infringed. 
73. For example, if the case discussed the infringement determination made by the 
court, but did not mention whether validity was tried because the resolution of that issue was 
not appealed or not discussed in the court opinion, I included no information in the study 
regarding validity of that case. 
74. Throughout the results and tables, I will refer to the alleged infringer as "the in­
fringer" for brevity. 
75. When patents are issued by the PTO, they are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282 
(1994). Accordingly, the alleged infringer has the burden of proving the patent invalid by 
clear and convincing evidence. Since patents are already valid, when validity is challenged, 
the court holds the patent invalid or not invalid. But for brevity, I refer to patents as adjudi­
cated valid or invalid throughout the tables and results. 
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• The amount of damages awarded (not including costs, interest, at­
torneys fees or trebling). 
• Whether and how much the district court enhanced damages after 
a finding of willfulness. 
• Whether there was an appeal to the Federal Circuit and, if so, 
whether the factfinder's decisions were affirmed or reversed. 
The population consisted of 1411 cases comprising 1948 separate 
patent claims.76 
Ill. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The popular view expects greater success for patent holders in pat­
ent litigation before juries than for patent holders in litigation before 
judges. The economic theory, however, forecasts similar success rates 
for patent holders regardless of adjudicator, assuming that parties 
have equally accurate information about both. Does either of these 
views explain the increased demand for jury trials in recent years? The 
empirical evidence suggests that juries are more likely to hold for the 
patent holder on some issues, substantiating the popular view. It also 
exposes some shortcomings of jury decisionmaking which may not be 
measurable from appellate affirmance rates. 
Surprisingly, few patent cases go to trial each year. For the period 
of the study, the percentage of patent suits going to trial each year 
ranged from 3.3% to 11 .9%. The percentage of suits going to trial for 
the entire period was 6.9% . Table 1 contains statistics detailing patent 
suit resolutions and trials. 
76. This number reflects the entire population of patent trials, not a sample study that 
chooses a limited number of trials or only reported trials. There were 1411 patent cases that 
made it to trial, but only 1209 of these were actually resolved by the factfinder. The other 202 
were either settled during trial, or the court ruled on directed verdict or JMOL prior to 
resolution by the factfinder. If JMOL occurred after the jury verdict, the original jury resolu­
tion is reported. 
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TABLE l 
Patent Suits # of Patent % of Patent Cases # of Jury % of Trials 
YEAR Terminated77 Trials78 Going to Trial Trials to a Jury 
1983 940 112 1 1.9 24 21 
1984 995 90 9.0 23 26 
1985 988 85 8.6 20 24 
1986 1088 89 8.2 26 29 
1987 1031 89 8.6 37 42 
1988 1122 108 9.6 54 50 
1989 1248 105 8.4 38 27 
1990 1124 96 8.5 34 35 
1991 1097 86 7.8 39 45 
1992 1315 90 6.8 52 58 
1993 1461 94 6.4 47 50 
1994 1513 90 5.9 64 71 
1995 1509 89 5.9 47 53 
1996 1697 101 6.0 54 53 
1997 1828 103 5.6 60 58 
1998 2034 103 5.1 62 60 
1999 2191 73 3.3 49 67 
The vast majority of suits are resolved in advance of trial either by the 
court on dispositive motion or by the parties themselves through set­
tlement.79 Increasingly, the patent cases that do progress to trial have 
been tried to a jury rather than to a judge. Why has jury resolution of 
patent cases increased so dramatically in recent years? Has the jury 
become better or more accurate at adjudicating these cases? Has the 
jury become increasingly biased in favor of the patent holder on liabil­
ity or more favorable on damages? A jury trial will result if either side 
requests one. If neither side requests a jury, the trial proceeds before a 
judge. If juries are biased in the manner popularly perceived, it is a 
wonder that there are ever any bench trials. Why would the patent 
holder ever forgo this valuable advantage?80 This section explores pos­
sible explanations for the increased use of juries in patent cases and 
dissects, as much as possible, judge and jury resolution of patent cases 
77. This column includes every patent case that was terminated by any means (settle­
ment, motion, trial, etc.). 
78. This column includes only those cases that ended after a trial was begun. These 
numbers include cases resolved by the factfinder at the conclusion of trial, cases resolved by 
directed verdict or JMOL, and cases that settled after the trial had begun. 
79. For example, in 1998, 24% of cases were resolved without court action, 59% of cases 
were resolved by court order or judgment on a motion, 12.5% were resolved after the pre­
trial conference but before trial, and 4.5% of all cases were resolved during or after a trial. 
80. I am presently conducting research to examine characteristics of bench trials to de­
termine whether there are any statistically significant predictors for the type of cases in 
which neither party requests a jury. 
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in the last seventeen years in light of popular perceptions and eco­
nomic theory on win rates. 
A. Overall Patentee Win Rates 
As shown in Figure 2, of the 1209 patent trial decisions in the data 
set, the patentee won 58% of all suits (706 cases) and the alleged in­
fringer prevailed in 42% (503 cases).81 These data indicate a statisti­
cally significant difference in overall win rate for the patentee and in­
fringer. Hence, we can reject with 99% confidence the null hypothesis 
that either party has an equal chance of winning a patent lawsuit.82 
81. A case was considered won by the patentee if the patentee won at least one patent 
claim in its entirety. If the patentee claimed two patents were infringed and the court con­
cluded that one of the two patents was valid, enforceable, and infringed, it was considered a 
verdict for the patentee, even if the other patent was held invalid or not infringed. If, how­
ever, the infringer prevailed on any issue with respect to each claim, it was considered a ver­
dict for the infringer. For example, if the patent was held valid and enforceable, but not in­
fringed, this case would be considered won by the infringer. 
82. In this study, I generally test a null hypothesis which would posit "no difference" in 
outcome or "no relationship" between events. In this case the null hypothesis would be "pat­
entees are not more likely to win patent suits than alleged infringers." The p value (also 
called significance level) is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually 
true. A rejection of null hypothesis with a p value p<.001 indicates that there is less than 1 
chance in 1000 of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis of equal predicted win rates. This 
would translate into a confidence level of 99.9%. Hence we could reject the null hypothesis 
with 99.9% confidence. A rejection of the null hypothesis with p<.01 is 99% confidence. A 
rejection of the null hypothesis with p<.05 is 95% confidence. Throughout this Article, I use 
the term "significant" in the formal statistical sense, indicating that the null hypothesis can 
be rejected with at least 95% confidence (p:5.05). If p>.05, I conclude that observed differ­
ences or relationships are not statistically significant; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
in these cases. I have tested these null hypotheses using chi-square analysis (the "Pearson 
statistic") which provides an inverse measure of the likelihood that the difference in means 
show real difference in win rate rather than random variation. 
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I also considered whether these results would change if overall win 
rate was determined based on a claim-by-claim analysis rather than a 
suit-by-suit analysis. A claim-by-claim analysis involves considering 
the win rate on each patent and product separately. Those results are 
as follows: 
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These data suggest that there is little difference between examining 
case win rates and claim win rates. When the jury is the adjudicator, 
the patent holder prevails in 63% of all claims and 68% of all suits. 
When the judge is the adjudicator, the patent holder succeeds in 49% 
of all claims and 51 % of all suits. 
There is a significant difference in win rate when the jury decides 
patent claims. Hence, the null hypothesis that "when a jury decides a 
patent claim there is an equal chance of success for the patent holder 
and the infringer" can be rejected. There is not a significant difference 
in the win rate, however, when the patent case is decided by a judge 
(51 % win rate). The null hypothesis that "when a judge decided a pat­
ent claim there is an equal chance of success for the patent holder and 
the infringer" cannot be rejected. The identity of the adjudicator, 
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therefore, is a statistically significant predictor of who wins the claims 
in the lawsuit.83 
At least initially, the patent-holder win rates follow the pattern 
predicted by popular perception - namely, higher win rates for the 
patent holder in jury trials, but not in judge trials. It would seem that 
the overall patent-holder win rate of 58% could be explained either by 
the notion that jury biases favor the patent holder, or by the selection 
effect theory, which predicts a patent-holder win rate above 50% to 
reflect the differential stakes that exist in patent cases. The data do not 
support the economic model, however, when broken down by judge 
and jury. The economic model predicted similar win rates for judges 
and juries because the parties factor known biases of the adjudicators 
into the determination of whether to try a case. In jury cases, the win 
rate exceeds 68%.  Again, one might argue that this is attributable to 
differential stakes in the suit that would cause the patentee to only try 
cases it has a high probability of winning and that correspondingly, 
there ought to be a high patentee win rate. This explanation for the 
higher win rate should be equally true in bench trials, however, but it 
is not. Bench trial adjudication would support the basic Priest/Klein 
50% hypothesis only if there were no systematic differential stakes in 
these cases. The empirical results suggest that the purified model with 
its simplistic assumptions does not reflect the reality of patent dis­
putes. 
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg, in their study of product li­
ability and medical malpractice cases, also observed a significant dif­
ference in judge and jury win rates.84 Their data revealed a signifi­
cantly higher win rate for plaintiffs in judge trials, contradicting 
popular perceptions of pro-plaintiff jury bias.85 They considered possi­
ble explanations for observable differences in judge and jury resolu­
tion of cases and concluded that misperceptions about adjudicators 
could explain differences in adjudicator win rates.86 If the parties per­
ceive the jury as biased in favor of the patent holder, but the jury turns 
out not to be biased, then cases that the parties assess to be close cases 
will actually be losers for the patent holder. If the parties perceive the 
jury to be bias in favor of the patent holder, but they do not accurately 
assess the magnitude of the juror bias, apparently close cases could ac­
tually be routine winners for the patent holder. Misperceptions re­
garding the severity of adjudicator bias could be the reason for differ-
83. A simple linear regression indicates that whether the adjudicator is a judge or jury is 
a statistically significant predictor of who wins both by suit (�=.174; t=6.172; p=.000) and by 
claim (�=.144; t=5.997; p=.000). 
84. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 1137. 
85. Id. at 1137-38. 
86. Id. at 1170-74 ("[T]he parties must inaccurately perceive the realities of judge and 
jury trial."). 
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ences in judge and jury win rate in patent cases, and, at least in patent 
cases, this misperception may well be tied to the rapid increase in jury 
demands. 
Figure 4 shows that win rates in judge trials have remained rela­
tively constant over the years. Jury win rates fluctuate over time87 and 
do not reveal a trend towards increasing patent-holder win rates, 
which might have explained the increase demand for jury trials. It does 
not appear as though changes in win rates over the last seventeen 
years can explain either the increase in juror resolution of patent cases 
or the difference in judge and jury win rates, unless the answer lies in 
the fluctuation itself. Perhaps bench trial win rates approximate 50% 
because judges are more consistent, allowing the parties to evaluate 
more accurately their relative win rates before a judge. The most im­
portant assumption of the Priest/Klein model is that parties form ra­
tional estimates of likely outcome based on applicable legal precedent 
and adjudicator bias.88 The Priest/Klein model assumes that if parties 
are making outcome estimation errors, the errors are homoskedastic, 
that is, independent of each other and random.89 As party estimation 
error diminishes, the patentee win rate should approach 50% .90 Stated 
another way, if the parties are unable to estimate outcome predictably 
because of a lack of clarity in the legal standard that will be applied or 
because of unpredictability in the adjudicator's application of the legal 
standard, then their estimation error will be higher and the tendency 
towards a 50% outcome prediction less certain. 
87. Such apparent fluctuation in win rate can be explained to some degree by the low 
number of instances of jury trials in the early years of the study (20-30 per year). With a 
small number of jury trials a few outcomes can significantly impact the win rate for the year. 
88. See Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 4. 
89. See Kobayashi, supra note 52, at 23. 
90. See Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 19. 
November 2000) Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases 389 
The seventeen-year time line for judge resolution of patent trials 
shows a relatively steady patent-holder win rate over the years. This 
indicates that judges' behavior in adjudicating patent disputes has fol­
lowed expected patterns. Such predictability allows for more accurate 
outcome estimation by parties, which will result in an outcome rate 
closer to the decisional standard (50% ). However, with jury resolution 
of patent trials being considerably less predictable during the 
seventeen-year time line (due in part to the relatively small number of 
jury trials that traditionally occurred), parties are less capable of accu­
rately estimating outcome. If, however, the parties realize that the jury 
is less predictable and that their outcome estimations are less accurate, 
one would expect the settlement range for both sides to increase and 
thereby reduce the number of cases going to trial. Moreover, there is 
no reason to believe error would be systematically skewed in one di­
rection. 
The phenomenon of jury resolution of patent cases is relatively 
new. As the parties and their attorneys become more experienced with 
jury resolution of patent cases, outcome estimation error will likely 
diminish, and there should be a progressive convergence toward an 
observable 50% outcome.91 Estimation error decreases with experi­
ence under a legal standard because the legal standard becomes more 
defined over time with experience; it becomes more predictable and 
more certain.92 A jury may never be like a legal standard, because ju­
ries are one-time players in the litigation game and have no opportu­
nity to learn from or build on past juror experiences or reasoning. If 
popular perception holds true, juries may be biased in ways that defy 
predictability. One can predict jury biases in favor of the patent 
holder, but it is more difficult to quantify juror incompetence to re­
solve technical matters or juries being swayed by emotional or tangen­
tial issues in a case. 
B. Substantive Issues Tried 
In order to dissect further each patent trial and isolate the issues 
that affect win rates before judges and juries, the 1209 cases going to 
trial in the data set are broken down by substantive issue: validity, en­
forceability, infringement, willfulness, and damages. A decision on one 
91. Priest and Klein describe this implication as follows: 
[A]n important determinant of the extent to which the observed success rate approximates 
50 percent will be the parties' error in estimating the outcome. As the parties' error dimin­
ishes, the 50 percent proportion of victories will be approached more closely. Since, for ex­
ample, we would imagine error to diminish with experience under a legal standard, the ap­
proach would imply a progressive convergence toward 50 percent victories after a change in 
a rule of law. 
Id. at 19. 
92. See id. 
390 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:365 
of these issues is reported below only if it was made by the factfinder 
(resolved at trial). 
TABLE 4 
Total # of Decisions Jury Judge 
Validity 1151 551 601 
Valid 67% (775) 71 % (389) 64% (387) 
Invalid 33% (376) 29% (162) 36% (214) 
Enforceability 530 206 324 
Enforceable 73% (387) 75% (155) 72% (232) 
Unenforceable 27% (143) 25% (51)  28% (92) 
Infringement 1359 706 653 
Infringed 65% (888) 71 % (503) 59% (385) 
Not Infringed 35% (471) 29% (203) 41 % (268) 
Willfulness 547 318 226 
Willful 64% (349) 71 % (227) 53% (122) 
Not Willful 36% (198) 29% (91) 47% (107) 
The results of the study allow confident assertion of the following: 
• patents are more likely to be held valid than invalid;93 
• patents are more likely to be held enforceable than unenforce­
able;94 
• patents are more likely to be held infringed than not infringed;95 
• patents are more likely to be held willfully infringed than not will­
fully infringed;% 
• patents are more likely than not to be held valid,97 enforceable,98 
infringed,99 and willfully infringed100 when adjudicated by a jury; 
• patents are more likely than not to be held valid,101 enforceable,102 
and infringed103 when adjudicated by a judge; 
93. x'=13s.ss9, df=l, p=.ooo 
94. x'=l12.332, df=l, p=.ooo 
95. x'=127.954, df=l, p=.ooo 
96. x'=41.684, df=l, p=.ooo 
97. x'=93.519, df=l, p=.ooo 
98. x'=52.505, df=l, p=.000 
99. x'=127.479, df=l, p=.ooo 
100. x'=ss.164, df=l, p=.ooo 
10i. x'=49.799, df=l, p=.ooo 
102. x'=60.494, df=l, p=.ooo 
103. x'=Z0.963, df=l, p=.ooo 
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• either party has an equal chance of winning on the issue of will­
fulness when adjudicated by a judge.104 
The higher win rate for the patent holder on the issues of validity 
and enforceability could reflect the fact that the patent is presumed 
valid and that the infringer must therefore prove the affirmative 
defenses of invalidity or unenforceability by clear and convincing evi­
dence. 105 This evidentiary burden is higher than the evidentiary stan­
dard of preponderance of the evidence which applies to infringe­
ment.106 The patent holder, however, must prove willfulness by clear 
and convincing evidence,107 and they are able to do so with great fre­
quency when juries are adjudicating the issue. 
These findings suggest that the patent holder has an edge on al­
most every issue in front of any adjudicator. Patent holders tend to 
succeed on the same types of issues before judges and juries, with the 
exception of willfulness where the jury is much more pro-patentee 
than the judge. The empirical results suggest that the evidentiary bur­
den of proof is more meaningful when judges are adjudicating. When 
judges adjudicate validity and enforceability, infringers are only suc­
cessful 36% and 28% of the time, respectively. Juries conclude patents 
are invalid or unenforceable 29% and 25% of the time, respectively. 
Patent holders' success rate in proving willful infringement, which also 
has the higher evidentiary burden, is 53% when judges are adjudicat­
ing the issue. When juries decide willfulness, patent holders are suc­
cessful in 71 % of the cases. On the issue of infringement, judges find 
infringement in 59% of the cases, reflecting this issue's lower eviden­
tiary burden of preponderance of the evidence. Juries find infringe­
ment in 71 % of the cases, which, considering the difference in eviden­
tiary standards, is remarkably close to juries' findings of willfulness. 
This contrast with judges' tendencies suggests that juries may be 
104. x'=.983, df=l, p=.322 
105. See Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) ("An accused infringer alleging that a claim is invalid must overcome the statutory 
presumption of validity that attaches to an issued patent, see 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994), by 
proving invalidity by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence."); Elk Corp. of 
Dallas v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 30 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that material­
ity and intent for inequitable conduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence). 
Not all enforceability issues require clear and convincing evidence. Laches and equitable 
estoppel, which are affirmative defenses not challenging the validity of the patent, but rather 
the enforceability of it against an individual defendant, require proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R .L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1045 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
106. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (stating that infringement must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence). 
107. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
("Willful infringement is a question of fact and must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence, for 'the boundary between unintentional and culpable acts is not always bright.' ") 
(quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
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swayed by bias and may not be giving the evidentiary burden much 
significance. 
1. Invalidity and Unenforceability: Not Easy Defenses at Trial 
These data reveal the impact that the choice of adjudicator has on 
the outcome of each issue. Adjudicator is a significant predictor for 
validity108 but not for enforceability.109 Judges and juries uphold the 
validity of patents with roughly the same frequency - 64 % and 71 % 
respectively.110 The fact that there is a significant difference between 
judge and jury adjudication of validity substantiates popular expecta­
tions that juries are more likely than judges to hold a patent valid be­
cause of perceived deference to the PTO. Other studies have indicated 
that when judges invalidate patents, they are more likely to do so on a 
dispositive motion in advance of trial than in a ruling following a 
trial.111 The import of this tendency is obvious: infringers need to put 
forth their best case of invalidity prior to trial, because if the case 
makes it to trial before either adjudicator, the patentee holds a signifi­
cant advantage in challenges to the patent. The data set for the present 
study includes only tried cases; it does not include dispositive mo­
tions.112 For this reason, it may underestimate the total likelihood of 
judicial invalidation. 
108. �=-.062; t=-2.247; p=.025 
109. �=-.036; t=-.919; p=.359 
1 10. This is considerably higher than the pre-Federal Circuit statistics of Koenig, who 
found that patents were held valid in 42% of cases, and Federico, who found that patents 
were held valid (not invalid) in 39% of cases. See KOENIG, supra note 66, § 4.02, at 4-19 (re­
porting that, from 1953 through 1977, 42% of litigated patents were held valid in the district 
courts, excluding those cases finding no infringement without ruling on validity); Federico, 
supra note 66, at 236 tbl. 2, 237 tbl. 4 (reporting that, from 1948-1954, 39% of litigated pat­
ents were not invalidated by the courts of appeals and 48% were not invalidated by the dis­
trict courts). My results also differ from the Allison/Lemley study (300 cases from 1989-
1996), which found 54% validity. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 66, at 205. The 
Allison/Lemley statistic, however, includes validity decisions rendered by the court on dis­
positive motion which resulted in a lower validity rate (on dispositive motion only 28% of 82 
patents held valid). See Allison & Lemley, supra note 66, at 212 tbl. 3. Their statistics on va­
lidity decided at trial are closer to mine (67% of 73 patents valid after jury trials, 57% of 143 
patents valid after bench trials). See id. 
111. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 66, at 212 tbl. 3 (reporting that, in a data set of 
published U.S.P.Q. decisions from 1989 to 1996, judges only invalidated patents at trial in 
43% of 143 cases, but they invalidated patents before trial in 72% of 82 cases). 
1 12. In order to compare accurately judge and jury decisionmaking, I limited the study 
to issues resolved at trial, as indicated supra note 76. 
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2. Infringement and Willfulness: Does the Jury Know Them 
When It Sees Them? 
393 
Adjudicator is not a significant predictor for challenges to the pat­
ent's enforceability, but it is a significant predictor for infringement113 
and willfulness.114 We can reject (with 99.9% confidence) the null hy­
potheses that there is no difference between judge and jury resolution 
of infringement and that there is no difference between judge and jury 
resolution of willfulness. The fact that juries are significantly more 
likely to find infringement and willfulness than a judge suggests that 
juries may harbor (as borne out by the outcome data) the popularly 
perceived bias in favor of the patent holder. These results could also 
support the common skepticism regarding the jury's ability to resolve 
complex, technical issues. If juries are less adept than judges at under­
standing the intricacies of complex technology, subtle technical differ­
ences between an alleged infringer's product and the product(s) cov­
ered by a patent may be lost on them - with the result that they find 
infringement more frequently. 
Juries find willfulness in almost three of four cases (71 % ) and 
judges only find it half the time (53 %  ), suggesting that juries are more 
easily convinced of an infringer's thieving intent. Juries may perceive 
the patentee who brings an infringement action as a victim and an in­
fringer accused of stealing patented technology, a villain. To find will­
fulness, the factfinder must conclude that the infringer intentionally or 
flagrantly disregarded the patentee's rights. The outcome data indicate 
that juries are more easily persuaded than judges by "bad guy" evi­
dence. 
After a factfinding of willful infringement is made by the judge or 
jury, the judge has the discretion to enhance damages, up to trebling, 
and to award attorneys' fees.115 The judge considers many factors in 
determining whether to enhance damages for willfulness including 
whether the infringer deliberately copied the patented technology, the 
infringer's behavior, size and financial condition, and closeness of the 
case.116 I examined the percentage of cases in which willfulness is 
found, how often damages are enhanced in response to willfulness, 
and how much they are enhanced. Judges considered whether to en­
hance damages in 219 cases,117 and the mean enhancement amount was 
113. �=-.123; t=-4.792; p=.000 
114. �=-.181; t=-4.417; p=.000 
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 ("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed."); id. § 285 ("The court in exceptional cases may award reason­
able attorney fees to the prevailing party."). 
1 16. See, e.g. , Read Corp. v. Portee, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
1 17. In many cases, willfulness was determined by the factfinder in an earlier stage of 
the proceedings than damages and/or the determination as to whether to enhance. The will-
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1 .69, indicating a mean of less than double damages when enhance­
ment is considered. Table 5 details the likelihood that damages will be 
enhanced by the judge. 
TABLE S 
Jury Decided Judge Decided 
TOTAL Willfulness Willfulness 
Enhancement1 18 219 136 83 
0 63 (30%) 59 (44%) 4 (5%) 
1-1.9 23 (11 %) 15 (11 %) 8 (11 %) 
2-2.9 50 (24%) 24 (18%) 26 (35%) 
3 74 (35%) 37 (27%) 37 (50%) 
Mean Enhancement 1 .69 1.33 2.33 
Attorney Fees 84 50 34 
Awarded 
Who decided that the patent was willfully infringed (judge or jury) is a 
statistically significant predictor of enhancement.119 These data indi­
cate that in 95% of the cases in which the judge found willfulness, 
damages were likely to be enhanced; however, when a jury found will­
fulness, the judge only enhanced damages in 63% of the cases. Attor­
neys fees were awarded to the patentee by the judge after a finding of 
willfulness in 84 cases: 50 in which the jury decided willfulness and 34 
in which the judge decided willfulness. In some instances, attorney fees 
were awarded in addition to multiplying damages; in some instances, 
attorney fees alone were awarded as an enhancement. These data in­
dicate that judges function as a check to temper jury findings on will­
fulness - or that judges simply give themselves more credit in terms 
of the likelihood that the willfulness decision is correct. 
C. Damages 
Of the 1209 tried cases in the data set, the factfinder awarded dam­
ages in 501.120 These awards are the raw compensatory dollar value 
fulness finding, along with other issues, was often appealed and reversed or vacated prior to 
a decision by the trial court regarding enhancement, or the case settled. 
118. Enhancement of 0 indicates no enhancement of the damage award found by the 
factfinder despite a finding of willfulness. Enhancement of 1-1.9 indicates that the judge did 
enhance damages and the magnitude of the enhancement was 1-1.9. For example, if the pat­
ent holder was awarded damages of $100,000, an enhancement of 10% would be 1 . 1  which 
would equal a total damage award of $110,000. The maximum allowable enhancement under 
the law is treble damages. This would be a 300% enhancement or 3 which would equal a to­
tal damage award of $300,000. 
119. �=.319; t=5.676; p=.000 
120. In cases resolved in favor of the infringer, there generally were no damage awards 
reported. In a few instances damage would be decided despite a verdict for the infringer in 
order to avoid piecemeal litigation (if there is a reversal at the Federal Circuit or by the trial 
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found by the factfinder; they are exclusive of costs, interest, trebling, 
or attorneys' fees. To prevent a few exorbitant awards from distorting . 
the data,121 the awards are examined in the following groupings: 
$0-$500,000; $500,001-$1 ,000,000; $1,000,001-$5,000,000; $5,000,001-
10,000,000; $10,000,001 and up. 
Although adjudicator Uudge or jury) is a statistically significant 
predictor for damages as grouped above,122 the perception that juries 
are much more likely to award multimillion dollar damages seems un­
founded. Judges make damage awards in excess of $5 million in 17% 
of the cases, and juries award them in 21 %.  Jury awards, as the Figure 
shows, are higher than judge awards, but the magnitude of the dis­
crepancy is lower than popularly predicted. This may be attributed in 
part to the fact that many parties who fear large jury verdicts settle 
their cases rather than take a chance on a runaway verdict.123 
court on JMOL, there need not be a new trial if all issues are resolved). In cases resolved in 
favor of the patentee, there often were no reported damage awards because damages were 
stipulated, the case settled, or damages were bifurcated and not reported. 
121. These results are reported in thousands: 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Jurv 6541 1093 19802 
Judge 4426 531 14573 
As the enormous standard deviation indicates, utilizing the mean or median damage awards 
would not be a satisfying approach to analyzing the differing awards. 
122. �=-.364; t=-2.854; p=.005 
123. In addition, courts can force a remittitur of the damage award or order a. new trial 
on damages when the jury verdict is excessive. See, e.g. , Celeritas Tech., Ltd. v. Rockwell 
Int'! Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (ordering remittitur of jury verdict from 
$57,658,000 to $17,484,160); Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 540 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) Gury verdict of $55,634,153 remitted to $14,000,000); AccuScan, Inc. v. Xerox 
Corp., No. 96 Civ. 2579(HB), 1998 WL 603217, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11 ,  1998) (granting new 
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D. Appeals 
Frankly, I don't know why I'm so excited about trying to bring this thing 
[patent suit] to closure. It goes to the Federal Circuit afterwards. You 
know, it's hard to deal with things that are ultimately resolved by people 
wearing propeller hats. But we'll just have to see what happens when we 
give it to them. I could say that with impunity because they've reversed 
everything I've ever done, so I expect fully they 'll reverse this, too. 
- Judge Samuel B. Kent124 
In order to assess the "accuracy" of the factfinder's decisions, the 
following issues were considered: how many of the final judgments 
were appealed, which issues were appealed, and the affirmance and 
reversal rates by issue and by adjudicator. Overall, district court rever­
sal rates for all cases appealed to the Federal Circuit for each calendar 
year are as follows: 







The data from this study should have demonstrated a considerably 
lower reversal rate than these overall rates because the data set was 
limited to issues resolved at trial by a factfinder. Such factual issues 
would be subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review for fact­
findings by the bench125 and the substantial evidence standard of re­
view for factfindings by the jury.126 These deferential standards of re­
view should result in a greater number of overall affirmances (lower 
reversal rates) by the Federal Circuit than in cases resolved on disposi­
tive motions (such as summary judgment), where the standard of re-
trial on damages because jury award of $40,000,000 relied on an impermissible basis). Al­
though the courts do not have the power to order a remittitur they effectively do so by issu­
ing an order that states that if the parties do not accept a remittitur of $x, then a new trial on 
the issue of damages will be granted because the jury verdict was excessive and not sup­
ported by the evidence. This data set reports the awards actually granted by the jury, not the 
amounts as modified by the judge. 
124. 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. 95-CV-113 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996). Judge Samuel 
B. Kent made this statement during a summary judgment hearing. Interestingly, the "pro­
peller hats" at the Federal Circuit affirmed the judge this time. See O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 
1 15 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
125. See, e.g. , Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (stating that factfindings made during a bench trial are reviewed for clear error). 
126. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 172 F.3d 
1361, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reviewing jury factfindings to ascertain whether they are sup­
ported by substantial evidence). 
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view would be de novo. But such was not the case. Although the "sub­
stantial evidence" standard (for juries' findings) is, in theory, more 
deferential than the "clear error" standard (for judges' findings), there 
is no practical difference that would predict different affirmance rates 
under the two standards.127 The tables below contain appeal results 
from the data set of tried cases. The first table contains the number of 
cases and issues appealed and overall affirmance and reversal rates.128 
Cases Appealed 























The results are remarkable. The Federal Circuit affirms judge fact­
findings in 78% of all judge issues appealed and affirms jury factfind­
ings in 78% of all jury issues appealed.130 These data indicate that the 
Federal Circuit upholds the findings of both types of adjudicators at 
the same rate, suggesting that jury factfindings are no less "accurate" 
than judge factfindings, as measured by appellate affirmance rate. 
Perhaps the appellate affirmance rate over time could help explain 
the increased demand for jury resolution of patent cases.131 Yet, as 
127. See United States v. Hill, 196 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) ("Basically 
there is deferential review and non-deferential (plenary) review, and whether deferential 
review is denominated for 'abuse of discretion' or 'clear error' or 'substantial evidence' or 
any of the other variants (with the exception of 'mere scintilla of evidence') that courts use 
makes little practical difference."); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1041 (1956) ("I know, however, that there are conscientious judges 
who find difficulty in deriving for themselves the distinction between 'clearly erroneous' and 
the present 'substantial evidence' rule."). 
128. In this study, an issue is counted as reversed if the adjudicator got it wrong, mean­
ing that the appeals court reversed or vacated the decision because of an error by the adjudi­
cator. Hence, any decision by the Federal Circuit vacating an issue and remanding it because 
it was wrongly decided by the adjudicator is treated as a reversal. When an issue is vacated 
simply because it need not be decided by the Federal Circuit (such as when an infringement 
finding is vacated because the patent is held invalid), it is not included in this study. 
129. No percentage is given for issues appealed versus issues resolved by district courts 
because it would be too difficult to ascertain this information. For example, if the Federal 
Circuit held a patent invalid, it need not resolve other appealed issues (enforceability, in­
fringement, willfulness). Since I could not verify that the issues resolved were in fact the only 
issues appealed, this percentage is left blank. 
130. Of course, there is some selection bias inherent in these figures. Not all cases get 
appealed. 
131. The appellate affirmation rates in Figure 7 are only for tried cases. They do not in­
clude appeals from summary judgments or cases resolved prior to adjudication by the fact­
finder. 
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Figure 7 indicates, there has been no improved "accuracy" as meas­
ured by Federal Circuit affirmance over time of jury trials that ex­
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Fig. 7: Affirmance Rates Qver Time 
1 .  Appeals By Substantive Issue 
In order to examine further the affirmance rate of the adjudicators 
on appeal, the 1261 appealed issues are broken up by subject matter. 
As Figure 8 indicates, the issues most frequently addressed on appeal 
are infringement and validity. These data do not correspond directly to 
the overall frequency with which particular issues are appealed be­
cause not all appealed issues are actually decided by the court. In 
many cases in the data set, several issues were appealed but the Fed­
eral Circuit limited its review to what was necessary to resolve the 
case. For example, an appeal might be made on validity, enforceabil­
ity, and infringement by the party who lost on those issues, and the 
Federal Circuit might hold the patent invalid and not reach the other 
issues. The category "?," which comprises 3 %  of appealed issues, rep­
resents summary affirmances for which I was unable to obtain briefs to 
ascertain the issues appealed.133 
132. The wildly divergent affirrnance rates for 1999 only reflect cases decided by the 
Federal Circuit as of October 31, 2000. Any Federal Circuit opinions issued after this date 
are not included in the dataset. It should be noted that the appeals process can be quite 
lengthy and many appeals of cases resolved by trial in 1998 or 1999 may not have been re­
solved as of this date. 
133. To determine what issues were being appealed in Rule 36 summary affirrnance 
cases, I obtained the briefs from the Federal Circuit archives. The 3 % figure represents the 
appeals for which the briefs could not be found and which were likely lost due to a flood at 
























The appellate affirmance rates for judge and jury resolution of the 
substantive issues of validity, infringement, and enforceability are al­
most identical. The affirmance rate for willful infringement is consid­
erably higher when the jury finds willfulness. Is the jury more "accu­
rate" at assessing bad intent than the judge? Jury findings of 
willfulness alone have little meaning in an infringement litigation un­
less the judge agrees to enhance the damage award as a result. As dis­
cussed above, judges are a significant check on juries' willfulness find­
ings and are much more likely to enhance their own willfulness 
findings.134 It is therefore unsurprising that willfulness findings by the 
jury generally are appealed only when the judge enhances damages.135 
Because virtually all jury willfulness findings that are appealed have 
actually been endorsed both by the jury, who made the finding, and by 
the judge, who decided the willfulness warranted enhanced damages, it 
is not surprising that these findings have a higher appellate affirmance 
rate. 
134. Judges enhanced damages in 95% of the cases in which they themselves found will­
fulness, but only 63% of the cases in which the jury found willfulness. 
135. The issue of willfulness was appealed in 98 instances in the data. In 70 instances, a 
finding of willfulness by the factfinder was challenged on appeal. In 28 instances, a finding of 
no willfulness was appealed. Where willfulness was challenged on appeal the court below 
had enhanced damages 92 % of the time. 
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There are several points worth noting about these appellate affir­
mance rates. First, the standards of review for the various issues differ 
but are generally very deferential. Infringement and willfulness are 
fact questions that would be reviewed under the substantial evidence 
standard for jury findings and the clearly erroneous standard for judge 
findings. As previously discussed, there is not much practical differ­
ence between these standards. Validity is a question of law which is 
reviewed de novo regardless of adjudicator. Certain types of validity 
decisions, such as obviousness, however, are questions of law based on 
underlying facts determined by the factfinder and those facts are re­
viewed under the deferential standards for each adjudicator. Enforce­
ability is an equitable consideration which is reviewed under the 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. These very deferential stan­
dards of review make appellate review far from an "accuracy" meter. 
Second, there is a significant difference between what these two 
adjudicators give the Federal Circuit to review. Judges are required by 
Rule 52(a) to articulate their findings of fact and conclusions of law.136 
Hence, the appellate court has a detailed roadmap of the district court 
judge's decision. The judge's findings, decisions, and reasoning are 
open to scrutiny by the appellate court. If the judge made erroneous 
factfindings or misapplied the law, the Federal Circuit can correct 
these errors on appeal. The jury's findings, however, cannot be dis­
sected and reviewed by the appellate court, because the jury is not re­
quired to articulate reasoning for its judgments. In fact, the Federal 
Circuit has concluded that it lacks supervisory power over the district 
courts137 and therefore cannot even mandate the use of special verdict 
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
137. See In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("This court has no ad­
ministrative authority over any district court."); In re Oximetrix, 748 F.2d 637, 643 (Fed. Cir. 
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forms or general verdicts with interrogatoriesY8 Although special ver­
dict forms are used in most patent trials, most of them are very general 
in nature and give no insight into the jury findings on particular issues. 
The special verdict might simply ask, "Did the defendant prove the 
patent obvious by clear and convincing evidence?" Seldom do the spe­
cial verdict forms actually force the jury to answer questions regarding 
the underlying facts. These sorts of verdicts are sometimes referred to 
as black box verdicts. With no insight into the jury's factfindings or 
reasoning underlying the verdict, how then can the Federal Circuit re­
view the verdict on appeal? 
The Federal Circuit reviews black box jury verdicts by presuming 
that the jury found all facts in the record in support of the verdict it 
chose.139 This evaluative process makes it much more difficult to over­
turn the black box jury verdicts on appeal than it is to overturn a judge 
verdict with its detailed factfindings and reasoning. This review proc­
ess may mask errors in jury comprehension of the technology at issue 
and potential flaws in the application of the law to the facts. For this 
reason, appellate affirmance rates provide little insight into the "accu­
racy" of jury decisionmaking. Given deferential standards of review, a 
lack of transparency in jury findings, and inability to mandate special 
verdicts, the Federal Circuit has limited ability to identify and correct 
jury inadequacies. 
1984) ("This court lacks the general authority over district courts exercisable, for example, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 332."); Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1552 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Unlike other Circuit Courts of Appeal, we have no direct supervisory 
authority over district courts.") (citation omitted). 
138. In Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co. , the court noted: 
This court has counselled district courts in appeals to us that specific answers from the jury 
on factual issues are desirable, and has praised courts which have provided comprehensive 
opinions in ruling on motions for JNOV. The decision of an appellate court is likely to be 
better focused when it is assisted in this manner. Otherwise the task of review may be unnec­
essarily comprehensive. Nevertheless, it must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court 
what form of verdict to request of a jury. Thus, we have held that a trial court may, with 
proper instructions, present a patent case to a jury for a general verdict encompassing all of 
the issues of validity and infringement or may ask for a general answer on one or more spe­
cific legal issues, such as obviousness, a practice not specifically provided for in the Federal 
Rules. 
749 F.2d 707, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); see also American Hoist & Derrick Co. 
v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
139. [In reviewing] a jury special verdict on patent claim obviousness where the underlying 
facts have been disputed . . .  [w]e first presume that the jury resolved the underlying factual 
disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave those presumed findings undisturbed if they 
are supported by substantial evidence. Then we examine the legal conclusion de novo to see 
whether it is correct in light of the presumed jury factfindings. 
Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 
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E. Problems with Jury Resolution of Issues That Can Be 
Teased Out of the Data 
As the statistical data thus far have shown, juries may harbor some 
of the biases that popular perceptions about them suggest. Juries do 
find for the patent holder more often on validity, infringement, and 
willfulness issues and they do award somewhat higher damages. The 
magnitude of the differences is much smaller than many might have 
anticipated, however. This could be explained in part by the economic 
models of selection effect theory, which suggest that known biases 
ought not to appear in the outcome data for tried cases because these 
biases would have been factored into the parties' estimations and deci­
sions regarding settlement. Because tried cases are not a random sub­
set of all disputes, I would not expect outcome data to reflect real bi­
ases or incompetence that may exist. 
If I stopped here, I might conclude that the data have not substan­
tiated significant reasons for concern about jury competence. There 
are other ways, however, to evaluate and assess the statistical data to 
ascertain whether they suggest that there are problems with jury 
resolution of patent cases. The remainder of this Part performs that 
evaluation. 
1 .  Winning is  All or Nothing: Correlation Between Validity and 
Infringement of Same Patent 
Many believe that juries vote for parties rather than decide issues, 
and that tangential issues sway decisionmaking.140 In order to test this 
idea, I looked at how many patent claims get decided all for a single 
party, and how many produce mixed results on validity and infringe­
ment, and what happens when there are multiple patents being tried. 
In evaluating each case where the factfinder considered both in­
fringement and validity issues for the same patent, I determined in 
what percentage of cases the factfinder found for the same party on 
both issues. The chart below shows the possible choices: 
VALID VALID 
INFRINGED NOT INFRINGED 
INVALID INVALID 
INFRINGED NOT INFRINGED 
If the factfinder found the patent valid and infringed or invalid and not 
infringed, then those claims would be counted as a verdict for the same 
party. If the factfinder found the patent invalid but infringed or valid 
140. See supra notes 14-36 and accompanying text. 
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but not infringed, then the claim would be counted as a mixed result.141 
As Figure 10 indicates, juries are much more likely than are judges to 
find for the same party when multiple issues need to be resolved. Ju­
ries find for the same party in 86% of all instances where they resolve 
both validity and infringement. Judges find for the same party only 
74% of the time. This difference in how judges and juries resolve mul­
tiple issues regarding a single patent claim is statistically significant.142 
2. Winning is All or Nothing: Multiple Claims 
In 301 of the 1209 suits in the data set (25% ) , the trial involved two 
or more patents or alleged infringement by two or more distinct prod­
ucts.143 I expected a correlation in outcome of multiple claims, because 
generally when multiple patents are asserted, they are related patents 
with similar limitations and similar infringement analysis. This ex­
pected correlation did not, however, predict the difference between 
judge and jury resolution of multiple claim cases which the data re­
vealed. 
141. It may seem strange that a factfinder would find the patent invalid, yet still go on to 
determine infringement. It is more efficient, however, to have the factfinder resolve all issues 
at once in case the appellate court overturns one issue. If the factfinder does not determine 
infringement when it finds a patent invalid, then if the appellate court reverses on validity, it 
must remand for a second trial to determine infringement. If the factfinder finds the patent 
invalid and still determines whether there was infringement, there is no need for a second 
trial, even if the appellate court reverses the invalidity determination. 
142. �=.117; t=4.469; p=.000 
143. Multiple claim cases in this data set are cases in which multiple patents were tried 
or multiple distinct products were alleged to infringe. If multiple products were accused of 
infringement, but they shares identical traits (a single claim term, for example, would resolve 
the infringement issue for all products) for purposes of the patent infringement analysis, the 
case was not treated as one involving multiple claims. In such a case, the factfinder's single 
infringement finding determined the outcome of all claims. 
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Judges reached mixed results with significantly greater frequency 
than juries, which decided cases in an all-or-nothing fashion. When the 
jury resolved multiple claims, in 87% of the cases it would resolve all 
the claims for the same party, while judges resolved all claims for the 
same party 72 % of the time. 
Adjudicator Gudge or jury) is a statistically significant predictor of 
whether multiple issues and multiple claims will get resolved for the 
same party or with mixed results.144 These data may indicate that juries 
are less able to understand the subtle technical differences which 
would result in mixed conclusions, while judges may be more subtle at 
resolving claims issue-by-issue rather than suit-by-suit. 
3. Declaratory Judgment Actions 
A perception exists that the alleged infringer will achieve some ad­
vantage by filing a declaratory judgment action against the patentee 
rather than waiting for the patentee to file an infringement suit. By 
filing the declaratory judgment action, the alleged infringer is able to 
choose the forum (the one it thinks most sympathetic to it) and the 
time that the suit will begin (enabling it to surprise the patentee and 
force it to litigate before it might be ready). 
Of the 1209 cases in the data set, 14% (168 cases) were declaratory 
judgment actions brought by the alleged infringer.145 Of the 1676 sepa­
rate claims, 15% (243) were declaratory judgment claims. 
144. �=.149; t=3.261; p=.001 
145. A case is considered a declaratory judgment action if the suit was filed by the al­
leged infringer. These statistics do not include counterclaim declaratory judgment actions. 
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TABLE S 
Cases Filed By Patentee Cases Filed By Infringer 
TOTAL 1433 243 
Patentee Wins Claim 58% 827 1 44% (106) 
Infringer Wins Claim 42% 606) 56% (137) 
Valid 71% 6851 50% (91) 
Invalid 29% 284) 50% (92) 
Enforceable 76% 342) 56% (45) 
Unenforceable 24% 107) 44% (36) 
Infringed 68% 794) 51 % (93) 
Not Infringed 32% 380) 49% (88) 
Willful 65% 316 58% (33) 
Not Willful 35% 173 42% (24) 
Who files the suit (patentee or alleged infringer) is a statistically 
significant predictor of who wins patent claims.146 It is also a statisti­
cally significant predictor of validity,147 enforceability,148 and infringe­
ment, 149 but not willfulness.150 
When these results are broken down by adjudicator, there are sig­
nificant differences. Who filed the suit is a statistically significant pre­
dictor of who wins patent claims in jury trials,151 but not in bench tri­
als.152 The difference for jury trials may occur because: (1) there is 
some advantage gained by the choice of forum; (2) the infringer bene­
fits from determining when the lawsuit begins; or (3) the jury is less 
likely to be biased in favor of the patentee when the infringer brings 
suit rather than the patentee. If popular perception is accurate, juries 
are more likely to find for the patent holder when they perceive her as 
the injured party seeking vindication. When the infringer brings suit, 
the patent holder may appear to be less of a victim and the infringer 
less of a villain.153 
146. �=.141; t=4.106; p=.000 
147. �=-.210; t=-5.618; p=.000 
148. �=-.206; t=-3.895; p=.000 
149. �=-.163; t=-4.306; p=.000 
150. �=-.067; t=-1.0; p=.318 
151. �=.298; t=6.168; p=.000 
152. �=.005; t=.113; p=.910 
153. In most cases, the patent holder who files a counterclaim for infringement, not the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff, will proceed first at trial. During argument or witness exami­
nation, however, the declaratory judgment plaintiff could likely make the jury aware that it, 
not the patent holder, filed the suit. 
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Breaking the claims down by substantive issue merely echoes the 
outcome findings. In jury trials, who files suit is a statistically signifi­
cant predictor of validity, enforceability, and infringement, but not 
willfulness. In bench trials, however, who files suit is not a statistically 
significant predictor for resolution of any of the substantive issues. 
Namely there is no obvious impact in the outcome data of j udge reso­
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These data suggest that forum selection may impact outcome. Per­
haps most significantly, the data imply that juries, but not judges, are 
much more sympathetic to the patent holder when the patent holder 
brings the infringement suit and much less so when the accused in­
fringer seeks declaratory judgment. 
F. Multivariate Regression Model 
A multivariate regression model has been used to isolate the ef­
fects of several independent variables on patent-holder win rate.154 The 
dependent variable is patent-holder win rate (win or lose) and the in­
dependent variables are adjudicator Uudge or jury), year of judgment, 
and who filed suit (patent holder or accused infringer). Multivariate 
regression facilitates examination of the separate effect of each inde­
pendent variable on the dependent variable (patent-holder win rate) 
- that is, the statistical significance of each independent variable in 
predicting patent-holder win rate. 
TABLE 9 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error Significance (p) 
Adjudicator .6118 .1055 .0000 
Year of Judgment .0060 .0107 .5743 
Who Brought Suit (pat- .5700 .1417 .0001 
entee or infringer) 
Constant -12.571 21 .251 .5542 
x'=52.335, df=3, p=.oooo 
pseudo r-squared=.031; log likelihood = 2249.51; Number of Claims=1948 
154. A logistic, rather than a linear, regression model is used because the dependent 
variable, patent-holder win rate, is binary or dichotomous (win or loss). See DAVID W. 
HOSMER, JR. & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 1 (1989). 
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Table 9 shows that who adjudicates the case Qudge or jury) and 
who files the case (patent holder or accused infringer) are significant 
predictors of the patent-holder win rate, but the year of the judgment 
is not a significant predictor of patent-holder win rates. When all these 
variables are held constant in the regression, who adjudicates the case, 
judge or jury, continues to have a significant effect on patent-holder 
win rate. 
The logistic regression makes possible estimation of the magnitude 
of the effect on outcome produced by each independent variable. Us­
ing the coefficients from Table 9, one can calculate the approximate 
change in win rate attributable to who is adjudicating the case. Com­
pared to a bench trial, in which the patent holder has a 50% chance of 
winning, the patent holder in an identical case tried to a jury has a 
65 % chance of winning.155 Compared to a case in which the accused 
infringer filed suit, where the patent holder has a 50% chance of win­
ning, when the patent holder files the suit the chance of winning in­
creases to 64 % . 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this Article, a database of all tried patent cases from 1983 to 
1999 has been used to test popular perceptions of juror bias and in­
competence and academic predictions of win rates. At times, the sta­
tistical results do validate some popular perceptions about judges and 
juries. Patent holders have been more successful in jury trials than in 
bench trials. Juries find for the patent holder more often on validity, 
infringement, and willfulness issues and they do award higher dam­
ages. The magnitude of the differences, however, is much smaller than 
many might have anticipated. In addition, there are no significant dif­
ferences in outcome data from judge and jury trials on the issue of en­
forceability of the patents confounding popular perception. 
This could be explained by the economic models of selection effect 
theory which suggest that known biases ought not to appear in the 
outcome data for tried cases because these biases would have been 
factored into the parties' estimations and decisions regarding settle­
ment. Because tried cases are not a random subset of all disputes, I 
would not expect outcome data accurately to reflect real biases or in­
competence that may exist. 
Concerns that juries are incompetent to resolve patent cases seem 
unsubstantiated by the results at first blush. Judges and juries are af-
155. Magnitude is calculated by taking the anti-log of the coefficient. For example, the 
coefficient for adjudicator is .6118. e0'1"=1.844. With all other variables constant, jury resolu­
tion changes the odds of the patent holder winning from 1:1 to 1.844:1. This corresponds to a 
probability of winning of 65% (1.844/(1 .844+1)). See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1 120, 1 131-32 & n.25 (1996) 
(explaining the mechanics of regression analysis). 
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firmed on appeal with equal frequency. The problem with using out­
come data and appellate affirmance rate as a measure of juror compe­
tency may lie in the lack of transparency of black-box jury verdicts 
combined with the deferential standards of review. It may be that the 
appellate affirmance rate and outcome data do not tell the whole 
story. 
Closer scrutiny of judge and jury decisionmaking elucidates differ­
ences which could implicate flaws in juror comprehension. Juries do 
not delineate issues in patent cases whether it be infringement and va­
lidity or infringement of multiple patents. Juries decide patent cases on 
an all-or-nothing basis more frequently than judges do. Jury decisions 
in declaratory judgment actions are also problematic. The patent 
holder has a significantly greater win rate in actions brought by the 
patent holder than in declaratory judgment actions brought by the in­
fringer. If this were true for both judge and jury trials, one could con­
clude that infringers only bring the action when they have stronger 
cases. There is no difference, however, in win rates in judge trials be­
tween infringement actions and declaratory judgment actions. 
The most plausible explanation of the data is that there are some 
differences in judge and jury resolution of patent cases. Because the 
database of tried cases is not a random or representative sampling of 
all patent disputes, however, it is impossible to quantify these differ­
ences beyond the results disclosed. It may be that the biases implicated 
by the outcome data can be identified because there has been a dra­
matic rise in demand for jury trials of patent cases. The parties' out­
come estimations have a higher error rate because of the sudden in­
creased demand for juror resolution of patent cases. If this explanation 
is correct, jury outcome data should tend towards 50% as parties get 
better at predicting outcome when juries are involved. This, of course, 
presumes that jury decisionmaking will become more predictable over 
time. Only time will tell. 
